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Abstract 19 
Recent work has proposed that social norms play a key role in motivating human cooperation, and in 20 
explaining the unique scale and cultural diversity of our prosociality. However, there has been little 21 
work directly linking social norms to the form, development, and variation in prosocial behavior 22 
across societies. In a cross-cultural study of eight diverse societies, we provide evidence that (1) 23 
adults prosocial behavior is predicted by what other members of their society judge to be the correct 24 
social norm, (2) childrens responsiveness to novel social norms develops similarly across societies, 25 
and (3) societally-variable prosocial behavior develops concurrently with childrens responsiveness to 26 
norms in middle childhood. These data support the view that the development of prosocial behavior 27 
is shaped by a psychology for responding to normative information, which itself develops universally 28 
across societies. 29 
30 
Introduction 31 
Human cooperative abilities are core to our success as a species 
1,2
 and differ in at least two important 32 
ways from those of other animals. First, people orchestrate group-level cooperation with large numbers 33 
of unrelated individuals. Second, cooperative behaviors vary considerably across societies 
3,4
, and this 34 
variation emerges during middle childhood 
5-9
. Some have suggested that the evolution of both can be 35 
explained if human social preferences are at least partly shaped by local cultural norms 
5
, which we 36 
acquire through an evolved psychology for learning and conforming to social norms 
6,7
. According to this 37 
claim, we can explain what makes humans so successful by demonstrating (1) that our prosocial 38 
behavior is linked to social norms, and (2) that we have a universally-developing psychology for 39 
responding to these norms.  40 
41 
Norms are central to numerous theoretical models of human sociality and development 
5,811
, and are 42 
generally conceived of as phenomena that regulate behavior through prescriptions and proscriptions 
12
. 43 
Following Bicchieri 
8,13
, we define a social norm as a behavior rule that individuals conform to when they 44 
believe that: (a) a sufficiently large number of people in their community conforms to the rule (empirical 45 
expectation), and (b) a sufficiently large number of people in their community expects them to conform 46 
to the rule (normative expectations). A descriptive norm, in contrast, would focus on empirical 47 
expectations. There is already some evidence that norms underlie variation in prosociality across 48 
societies and groups 
4,14
. However, most studies have only documented this variation across societies or 49 
explained it using society-level variables 
3,15
. What is needed is empirical evidence that societal variation 50 
in normative expectations gives rise to variation in prosocial behaviors. Such evidence would show that 51 
individuals prosocial behavior is predicted by what members of their society believe to be normatively 52 
correct in a particular situation (social norms). We must also distinguish the influence of social norms 53 
from that of individuals own beliefs about what is correct (personal norms).  54 
 55 
To connect societal variation in prosocial behavior to the development of a universal psychology for 56 
social norms, we must also show that across diverse societies childrens tendency to respond to social 57 
norms is increasing during the same period that adult-like prosocial behavior is forming. Children are 58 
sensitive to normative information as young as 1.5-4 years of age 
16
. At this age, they enforce norm 59 
conformity in others 
17
, follow descriptive and injunctive norms 
18,19
, are sensitive to moral and 60 
conventional rules 
20
, and they know that different groups follow different norms 
17
. Later, in middle 61 
childhood, children demonstrate an increasing responsiveness to novel social norms in experimental 62 
settings 
18
, suggesting that children of this age are becoming increasingly committed to modifying their 63 
behavior to conform to social norms. Interestingly, this is the same age that societal variation in 64 
childrens prosocial choices appears to emerge in costly sharing tasks (i.e. tasks which involve a choice 65 
between outcomes that benefit oneself and outcomes that benefit others) 
15,2124
. These findings suggest 66 
that middle childhood is a particularly important period for the adoption of locally-appropriate prosocial 67 
behaviors, and this could be the product of childrens increasing responsiveness to social norms at this 68 
age. As children are already sensitive to norms by the time that they reach middle childhood, changes in 69 
behavior during middle childhood may be due to developmental changes in their willingness to conform 70 
to norms, particularly their willingness to conform to norms which impose costs on them.  71 
 72 
If societal variation in adults prosocial behavior is linked to societal beliefs about correct prosocial 73 
choices, this provides evidence that prosocial behavior is motivated by social norms above and beyond 74 
personal norms (Prediction 1). If childrens responsiveness to social norms is developing during 75 
childhood, then with increasing age their prosocial choices should become more adult-like and variable 76 
across societies (Prediction 2), and also more strongly influenced by novel social norms (Prediction 3). 77 
This would provide two independent sources of evidence for the hypothesis that social norms have 78 
increasing influence on childrens prosocial behavior as they mature, and would be consistent with the 79 
results of prior studies. If childrens willingness to respond to norms develops similarly across a wide 80 
range of different societies, it would provide evidence for a universally-developing human psychology 81 
for responding to social norms (Prediction 4). If this societally-common responsiveness to norms 82 
develops concurrently with the development of adult-like prosocial behavior, it would provide evidence 83 
that a universally-developing psychology for social norms can explain the emergence of societal 84 
variation in prosocial behavior (Prediction 5).  85 
 86 
We conducted field experiments on prosocial behavior using the Dictator Game (DG) as a measure of 87 
costly sharing with 255 adults (131 female) and 833 children (414 female) aged 4-17, in eight 88 
populations ranging from foragers to small-scale horticulturalists to large urban communities (Table 1). 89 
The DG provides a well-validated test of an individuals willingness to share with others at a personal 90 
cost, and its standardized design facilitates direct comparison across populations (Figure 1) 
25
. We used a 91 
binary-choice version of the DG in which subjects chose between two options: they could keep two 92 
rewards and give none to an absent anonymous peer (the 2/0, self-maximizing option), or they could 93 
keep one reward and give one to the peer (the 1/1, prosocial option). This version of the task is 94 
appropriate for children aged ш4 years and adults 15,26,27. All child and adult subjects included in the 95 
dataset passed three comprehension questions confirming they understood the DG procedure, the 96 
content of the norm prime videos, and that larger quantities of rewards resulted in higher payoffs 97 
(Supplementary Information pg.25). 98 
 99 
Before each subject made their choice in the DG, they viewed a short video in which an adult model 100 
verbalized novel normative information about the two options in the DG (we refer to this normative 101 
information as the norm prime) 
18
. Videos used a standardized script, but were recorded at each 102 
fieldsite using local translations of the script and local adults as models. Across three between-subjects 103 
conditions participants were presented with different norm primes. In the GENEROUS condition, the 104 
norm prime indicated that 1/1 was right and good to choose, while 2/0 was wrong and bad to 105 
choose. In the SELFISH condition, the norm prime indicated that 2/0 was right/good to choose and 106 
1/1 was wrong/bad to choose. Importantly, the videos did not show the model making a choice in the 107 
DG, they simply presented the norm prime as if musing about the choice between 1/1 and 2/0. In the 108 
BOTH OK condition, the model stated that 1/1 and 2/0 were both ok/ok to choose, language that isnt 109 
strongly normative but which could arguably be at least weakly normative. Regardless, BOTH OK 110 
provides a reference point about subjects prosocial choices when they have been given information 111 
that does not preferentially bias them towards either 1/1 or 2/0 (as the GENEROUS and SELFISH 112 
conditions had done).  113 
  114 
To test Prediction 1, adult subjects in all eight societies received only the BOTH OK norm prime before 115 
they made their choice in the DG. We used these data to assess variation in the probability of adults 1/1 116 
choices across societies. In seven of the eight societies we also elicited judgments about which norm 117 
prime was correct (practical limitations required using an abbreviated procedure with the Hadza, 118 
precluding collection of data on judgments; Supplementary Information pg.28). In these seven societies, 119 
after subjects had made their choice in the DG, they were presented with both the GENEROUS and 120 
SELFISH norm prime videos (randomizing the order of presentation), and asked which of the videos they 121 
believed to be more correct. This judgement could be influenced both by what participants believe is 122 
correct for them to choose (personal norms), and also by what they believe is correct for others to 123 
choose (social norms). If individuals DG choices are influenced by social norms, then their choices are 124 
expected to be predicted by the judgments of others in their society (i.e. others beliefs about what is 125 
the correct norm) in addition to their own judgments. Subjects judgments allow us to study how 126 
society-level beliefs influence prosocial behavior, without requiring subjects to explicitly report what 127 
they think other members of their community believe to be correct. This is important for a cross-cultural 128 
study, as comfort and familiarity with discussing others thoughts or mental states varies across societies 129 
28
.  130 
 131 
To test Prediction 2, a subset of child subjects in all eight societies also received the BOTH OK prime, and 132 
we explored how the probability of childrens 1/1 choices changes with age in the BOTH OK condition. 133 
To determine how adult-like prosocial behavior develops, we explored whether childrens prosocial 134 
choices were predicted by the prosocial choices of adults from their own society, and whether this 135 
relationship changed as a function of childrens age. 136 
 137 
To test Prediction 3, in six of the eight societies two additional subsets of children were presented with 138 
either the GENEROUS or SELFISH norm primes (practical limitations prevented testing these additional 139 
samples in both Tanna and Hadza) in a between-subjects design. We explored whether the GENEROUS 140 
prime increased the probability of 1/1 choices relative to the BOTH OK prime, and whether the SELFISH 141 
prime decreased this probability relative to the BOTH OK prime. If subjects prosocial choices in the DG 142 
were responsive to the normative information provided by the priming videos, then subjects are 143 
expected to be more likely to choose 1/1 in GENEROUS than in BOTH OK, and less likely to choose 1/1 in 144 
BOTH OK than in SELFISH. To test Prediction 4, we then explored whether the development of childrens 145 
responsiveness to the primes varied across societies. 146 
 147 
To test Prediction 5, we compared the development of adult-like DG choices in children,  the 148 
development of childrens responsiveness to novel social norms (e.g. GENEROUS, SELFISH norm primes), 149 
and the development of childrens tendency to make choices consistent with adults beliefs about social 150 
norms (i.e. the probability that adults in their society judged GENEROUS to be most correct). If these 151 
different developmental trajectories align, and if childrens responsiveness to novel social norms 152 
develops similarly across societies, this will suggest that societal variation in prosocial development is 153 
linked to the development of a universal psychology for responsiveness to social norms.  154 
 155 
Results 156 
Prediction 1. We explored whether adults DG choices varied across societies by comparing regression 157 
models using WAIC and AIC weight (Table 2). Model 1a represents the hypothesis that DG choices do 158 
not vary across societies. Model 1b represents the hypothesis that DG choices vary across societies and 159 
includes dummy parameters for each society. We had no predictions about Age and Gender for adult 160 
subjects, but Model 1c included interactions with these variables to consider whether they were 161 
important. Model 1b provides a better fit to the data than the other models (reflected by lower WAIC 162 
and higher AIC weight; Table 2), indicating that the probability of a 1/1 choice varied substantially across 163 
societies, and that this variation was not a by-product of variation in the distribution of Age or Gender 164 
across societies (the estimates of Models 1c and 1b are similar; Supplementary Figure 12). 165 
 166 
The probability that adults would choose the 1/1 option varied across societies (Model 1b; Fig.2a; 167 
Supplementary Table 3). Information about mean amounts given in a continuous DG were available for 168 
three of the societies in our sample (from a previous study), and the proportion of 1/1 choices in the 169 
present binary DG (Americans=.54, Shuar=.20, Hadza=.20) were similar to the mean amounts given in 170 
the continuous DG (Americans=.45, Shuar=.34, Hadza=.26; triangles in Fig.2a) 
4
. This suggests that 171 
societal variation in choices is stable across different versions of the DG, and also that our experiment 172 
elicits a form of prosocial behavior that has been linked to cultural adaptations related to religious 173 
beliefs, market norms, and norms for living in large communities 
35,29
. This also implies that the BOTH 174 
OK prime does not alter individuals preferences in the DG. 175 
 176 
The probability that adults judge the GENEROUS norm prime to be more correct also varied across 177 
societies (Model 2; Fig.2b; Supplementary Table 3). To determine whether societal differences in 178 
judgments about correct norms predicted subjects DG choices, we constructed a two-stage model. 179 
The first stage of Model 3 was equivalent to Model 2, and estimated the probability that adults in each 180 
society would judge GENEROUS to be more correct. The second stage predicted adults 1/1 choices in 181 
the DG using: (1) the first-stage estimates of the probability that GENEROUS would be judged to be 182 
more correct in an adult subjects society, and (2) adults own judgments as to whether GENEROUS was 183 
more correct. Both of these parameters predicted adults DG choices. Subjects were more likely to 184 
choose 1/1 if they themselves later judged the GENEROUS norm prime to be more correct (Fig.2c; 185 
Coef=1.61, StDev=0.33, 95%CIs=0.96,2.27; Supplementary Table 4). Subjects were also more likely to 186 
choose the 1/1 option if they lived in a society where people were generally more likely to judge the 187 
GENEROUS norm prime to be more correct (Fig.2c; Coef=0.46, StDev=0.22, 95%CIs=0.08,0.93; 188 
Supplementary Table 4).  189 
 190 
Prediction 2. We explored whether childrens DG choices changed with age in the BOTH OK condition 191 
(the same condition presented to adults) by again comparing models using WAIC and AIC weight (Table 192 
3). Model 4a included society dummy parameters only (the same structure as Model 1b), representing 193 
the hypothesis that DG choices vary across societies but do not change with age. Model 4b represents 194 
the hypothesis that childrens choices changed with age, by including interactions between society 195 
dummies and Child Age. Model 4c included an Age
2
 parameter to explore whether a u-shaped effect of 196 
age would improve model fit, and Model 4d included interactions between society dummies and subject 197 
Gender. Model 4b provides a better fit to the data than the other models, reflected in a higher AIC 198 
weight (Table 3). There is a large standard error for the difference in WAIC for Model 4a, so we report 199 
the results for both Model 4a and 4b in Supplementary Table 5. These analyses suggest that childrens 200 
1/1 choices changed with age, which is illustrated by plotting Model 4b (Fig.3a). Plotting the estimates of 201 
Models 4c and 4d suggests they produce qualitatively similar results (see Supplementary Figures 13-14). 202 
 203 
We explored whether childrens DG choices became increasingly like those of adults with age, using a 204 
two-stage model (Model 5). The first stage was similar to Model 1b, and estimated the probability that 205 
adults in each society would choose the 1/1 outcome. The second stage predicts each childs DG choice 206 
using the first stage estimates of the probability that adults from their society would chose 1/1, and 207 
included an interaction between the first stage estimates and child age. The interaction was reliable, 208 
indicating that with increasing age childrens DG choices were increasingly predicted by the DG choices 209 
of adults (Coef=0.55, StDev=0.27, 95%CIs=0.09,1.16; Supplementary Table 6). Plotting this relationship 210 
shows that the model predicts childrens choices become positively related to adults choices after 211 
about age 8, with this estimate becoming reliably different from zero after about age 10 (Fig.3b). 212 
 213 
Predictions 3 and 4. We explored whether childrens DG choices were influenced by norm primes by 214 
comparing models of childrens choices in all three conditions (BOTH OK, GENEROUS, SELFISH) in the six 215 
societies for which these data were available (excluding Tanna and Hadza), once more comparing 216 
models using WAIC and AIC weight (Table 4). Model 6b represents the hypothesis that children 217 
responded to norm primes, by including dummy parameters for the GENEROUS and SELFISH conditions. 218 
Model 6a represents the hypothesis that children did not respond to norm primes, by excluding these 219 
parameters (the same model structure as Model 4b). Model 6c represents the hypothesis that childrens 220 
responsiveness to norm primes changes with age, by including interactions between Child Age and 221 
dummies for GENEROUS and SELFISH. Model 6d represents the hypothesis that the development of a 222 
responsiveness to norm primes varies across societies, by including three-way interactions with society 223 
dummies, Child Age, and dummies for GENEROUS and SELFISH. 224 
 225 
Model 6c provides a substantially better fit to the data than Model 6a or Model 6d (Table 4). This 226 
suggests that children were responsive to norm primes and that this responsiveness developed similarly 227 
across societies. Model 6c had a slightly larger AIC weight than Model 6b (Table 4), indicating that both 228 
models fit the data well, but the inclusion of parameters for Child Age improved model fit to some 229 
extent. In both Models 6b and 6c there are reliable effects for the GENEROUS dummy (Model 6b: 230 
Coef=1.47, StDev=0.20, 95%CIs=1.07,1.86; Model 6c: Coef=1.47, StDev=0.20, 95%CIs=1.07,1.86; note: 231 
nearly identical estimates; Supplementary Table 7) and also for the SELFISH dummy (Model 6b: Coef= -232 
1.00, StDev=0.24, 95%CIs= -1.48,-0.52; Model 6c: Coef= -1.03, StDev=0.25, 95%CIs= -1.52,-0.54; 233 
Supplementary Table 7). This means that children were substantially more likely to choose 1/1 when 234 
they received the GENEROUS norm prime (relative to BOTH OK), and substantially less likely to choose 235 
1/1 when they received the SELFISH norm prime.  236 
 237 
Model 6c also provides evidence of an interaction between Child Age and GENEROUS that is borderline 238 
reliable, as the lower CI is zero (Coef=0.40, StDev=0.21, 95%CIs=0.00,0.81; Supplementary Table 7), 239 
while the interaction between Child Age and SELFISH is clearly not reliable (Coef=0.29, StDev=0.25, 240 
95%CIs= -0.19,0.78; Supplementary Table 7). This suggests a modest developmental increase in 241 
childrens responsiveness to the GENEROUS norm prime but not to the SELFISH norm prime. Plotting 242 
these model estimates (Fig.4a) indicates that children are somewhat more likely to choose 1/1 in 243 
GENEROUS than in BOTH OK across the entire age range, but this responsiveness to GENEROUS is only 244 
reliable after about age 6-7, and increases through middle childhood. Plotted estimates also suggest 245 
that children are somewhat less likely to choose 1/1 in SELFISH across the entire age range, but this 246 
responsiveness to SELFISH is less pronounced, less consistently reliable, and shows little sign of change 247 
with age. 248 
 249 
The model comparison analysis in Table 4 implies that the development of childrens responsiveness to 250 
norm primes did not vary substantially across societies. To confirm this, we plotted the results of Model 251 
6d separately for each of the six societies (Fig.4b-4g). All of the societies reveal a responsiveness to the 252 
norm primes. For four of the societies (La Plata, Shuar, Pune, and Wichí) the results are qualitatively 253 
consistent with the overall developmental pattern in Figure 4a: responsiveness to norm primes becomes 254 
reliable sometime around age 6-7 and thereafter increases, particularly for the GENEROUS norm prime. 255 
The developmental pattern for responsiveness to the SELFISH norm prime seems to be more 256 
inconsistent, plausibly due to a floor effect in some societies in which children are unlikely to choose 1/1 257 
in the BOTH OK condition. For the two other societies (Berlin and Phoenix), reliable differences between 258 
each of the conditions appear to emerge by age 4 or earlier, and childrens responsiveness to the norm 259 
primes appears to change somewhat less with age (with the exception of reduced responsiveness to the 260 
SELFISH norm prime in older children in Phoenix).  261 
  262 
Prediction 5. We explored the relationship between childrens DG choices and adults DG choices (as for 263 
Prediction 2) in the six societies in which we investigated responsiveness to norm primes. This afforded 264 
the closest comparison between the development of adult-like DG choices and the development of a 265 
responsiveness to norm primes. Model 7 used the same two-stage structure as Model 5, and produced 266 
the same result: convergence between childrens and adults 1/1 choices increased with age (Coef=0.85, 267 
StDev=0.42, 95%CIs=0.15,1.81; Supplementary Table 8). Using the same approach and model structure, 268 
Model 8 explored the relationship between childrens DG choices and adults judgments. This model 269 
shows that with age childrens 1/1 choices were increasingly predicted by the estimated probability that 270 
adults from their society would judge GENEROUS to be more correct (Coef=0.61, StDev=0.24, 271 
95%CIs=0.20,1.16; Supplementary Table 9). Plotting both of these results shows that from about age 8 272 
childrens choices are positively related to both adults DG choices and adults judgments, and this 273 
relationship was reliable from about age 9-10 (Fig.3c-3d). These analyses reveal that adults DG choices 274 
and judgments both predict childrens choices, but not whether these are independent effects (when 275 
both parameters are included in a single model, neither effect is reliable; Supplementary Table 10). 276 
Discussion 277 
This study presents three main findings: (1) cross-cultural variation in adults prosocial behavior is 278 
related to what members of their society judge to be the correct prosocial norm (Prediction 1); (2) in 279 
middle childhood and early adolescence childrens prosocial behavior becomes increasingly similar to 280 
adults prosocial behavior (Prediction 2), and also increasingly similar to adults judgments about the 281 
correct prosocial norm; (3) by middle childhood children in very different societies develop a uniform 282 
tendency to respond to novel social norms about prosocial behavior, and this coincides with the 283 
development of adult-like societal variation in that behavior (Predictions 3, 4 and 5). Together, these 284 
findings link societal variation in prosociality to the development of a universal psychology for 285 
responding to social norms. 286 
 287 
Adults DG choices were predicted by the probability that members of their society would judge the 288 
generous norm prime to be more correct. This effect was independent of the influence of individuals 289 
personal norms, indicating that individuals prosocial choices were related to local social norms (i.e. 290 
society-level beliefs about what is correct). We note that this need not have been the case: individuals 291 
personal norms could have been the only factor predicting decisions, and other differences across 292 
communities (e.g. relatedness, community size, migration rates) could have created enough societal 293 
variation in prosocial choices to swamp the influence of societal-level norms.  294 
 295 
During middle childhood childrens prosocial choices became increasingly predicted by the prosocial 296 
choices of adults from their own societies, with this relationship emerging by about age 8-10 at the 297 
latest. This is consistent with findings from prior studies showing that societal variation in prosociality 298 
and fairness emerges during middle childhood and early adolescence 
15,21,22
. We extend this work to 299 
show that during middle childhood (by age 8-10) childrens choices become increasingly predicted by 300 
the probability that adults from their society would judge generous norm primes to be more correct. 301 
This is consistent with our finding that adults own prosocial choices were predicted by local beliefs 302 
about what is correct, and it reinforces the idea that during this developmental period childrens 303 
prosocial choices are becoming both more adult-like and more attuned to local prosocial norms. Future 304 
studies should explore whether these are independent developmental phenomena, and whether 305 
childrens prosocial behavior is better predicted by adults prosocial behavior or judgments about local 306 
norms. 307 
 308 
Although childrens prosocial choices generally became more adult-like with age, there were exceptions 309 
to this pattern. For example, in Pune and Tanna older children were less likely to choose 1/1 than were 310 
adults. In both of these sites, adults chose 1/1 with a probability close to 0.5, and they also judged the 311 
GENEROUS norm prime to be more correct with a probability close to 0.5. This suggests that adults in 312 
these communities held a variety of beliefs about correct norms for behavior in the DG, and this 313 
heterogeneity could complicate childrens attempts to navigate towards adult-like patterns of behavior. 314 
This interpretation is supported by the pattern of variation in the Phoenix sample. In Phoenix, adults 315 
chose 1/1 with a probability close to 0.5, but they were much more likely to judge the GENEROUS norm 316 
prime to be more correct. This suggests that there was a greater consensus in beliefs about prosocial 317 
norms in the DG in Phoenix than in Pune and Tanna, and it may explain why children in Phoenix seemed 318 
to follow the overall trend towards adult-like behavior. The lack of clearly adult-like choices for children 319 
in Berlin may be an artifact of the composition of the sample. In Berlin, the oldest children in our BOTH 320 
OK sample are only about age 10, the age at which reliably adult-like choices begin to emerge.   321 
 322 
In prior studies with the DG, we found that children were more generous in early childhood than in 323 
middle childhood 
15,27
, a u-shaped pattern that we did not replicate here. This may be due to different 324 
experimental procedures. Previously, subjects were face-to-face with their partners, while in the present 325 
study subjects were alone and anonymous. By about age 5, children are more likely to be selfish when 326 
they are unobserved 
30,31
, but it is unlikely that children younger than age 5 use anonymity strategically 327 
as they are not very good at managing their reputation 
32
. It is more plausible that the lack of face-to-328 
face contact with a partner in our study reduced social factors, such as empathy 
33
 and a desire to 329 
interact with others 
34
, factors that are more likely to motivate prosociality at this age. Future work 330 
should directly compare the influence of these factors (as well as motivations such as strategic 331 
reciprocity 
23,3537
, kin biases 
38
, and group biases 
39
) with the influence of norms on costly prosocial 332 
behavior in early and middle childhood. 333 
 334 
Our experiments show that novel social norms influenced childrens prosocial choices. Childrens 335 
responsiveness to novel norms developed similarly across societies, generally increasing with age and 336 
becoming a reliable effect by about age 6-8. This suggests that childrens sensitivity to novel norms is 337 
growing at the same age at which their choices are also becoming more adult-like and more consistent 338 
with adults judgments about correct behavior. Evidence for a developmental increase in childrens 339 
responsiveness to generous norm primes was modest, but this nonetheless provides evidence for 340 
developmental changes in childrens willingness to pay a cost to conform to a norm.  341 
 342 
Developmental changes may have been obscured by childrens responsiveness to norms emerging 343 
somewhat earlier in some societies than in others. For four societies (La Plata, Shuar, Pune, Wichí), 344 
responsiveness to generous norm primes became reliable by about age 6-8, and seemed to increase 345 
through middle childhood. However, for two societies (Berlin and Phoenix) reliable responsiveness 346 
emerged by age 4. This implies broad cross-cultural similarity in development, but also some variation in 347 
timing. This is consistent with prior work showing that the foundations of moral evaluation 
40
, prosocial 348 
behavior 
41
, and normative behavior are present early in childhood 
1620
. It also supports the proposal 349 
that adult-like prosocial behavior emerges due to increases in childrens responsiveness to normative 350 
information, rather than fundamental changes in their ability to conform to norms (given that in at least 351 
some societies this is present earlier).  352 
 353 
Our studies suggest that the emergence of adult-like prosocial behavior is linked to the development of 354 
childrens responsiveness to normative information. Future research should explore in detail how 355 
childrens willingness to respond to norms changes during middle childhood, and how the development 356 
of this willingness predicts childrens tendency to behave like adults. In Phoenix and Berlin, children 357 
younger than age 6-8 were willing to pay a cost to conform to norms, but they did not make very adult-358 
like choices in the BOTH OK condition. In these societies, childrens responsiveness to norms in early 359 
childhood may be based less on a general interest in behaving normatively, and more on a tendency to 360 
interpret normative information as what adults want them to do. If adults in these societies tend to 361 
strongly encourage and enforce normative behavior at young ages, children may have learned to simply 362 
do whatever adults say the right thing to do is. This highlights that the critical developmental change in 363 
middle childhood is likely an increasing willingness to pay a cost to behave normatively, and it will be 364 
crucial for future studies to ask how this is shaped by other aspects of psychological development, such 365 
as increases in perspective taking or mental state reasoning, emotional development and cognitive 366 
inhibition 
42
.  367 
 368 
Equally important will be understanding the role of social environment, which has a crucial influence on 369 
prosocial behavior in infancy 
43
, and may also affect prosocial behavior later in childhood. For example, 370 
childrens choices in costly sharing tasks become markedly more egalitarian if they have been exposed 371 
to civil warfare between the ages of 7 and 12, but not if the exposure occurred earlier in development 372 
(age 3-6) 
44
, and these effects seem to persist across the lifespan. Although the results of the present 373 
study are most informative about the development of childrens responsiveness to normative 374 
information in personally-costly cooperative dilemmas, it will also be important to explore how 375 
childrens responsiveness develops differently across domains or contexts. 376 
 377 
Future work should also explore other strategies for modeling the nature of social norms within 378 
communities. Our strategy was based on the estimated probability with which individuals in a society 379 
judged generous norms to be most correct, an approach similar to what has been used in prior studies. 380 
In a study of costly punishment in 15 societies, individuals decisions about whether to punish 381 
selfishness in third-parties were predicted by the mean amount that members of their society gave in a 382 
DG 
4
. Similarly, in a study of cooperation across camps of Hadza foragers, individuals contributions in a 383 
public goods game were predicted by the mean contribution of members of their camp in the same 384 
game 
14
. This suggests that modeling norms using the frequency of a behavior (or the probability of 385 
particular normative judgments) is an effective strategy, but other approaches may be even better, for 386 
example a more conformist approach 
6,45
. Future experiments should also explore the content of norms 387 
in other ways, for example by eliciting judgments from subjects about what others in their society do or 388 
expect them to do, or judgments about how similar the game is to real-world situations. 389 
 390 
Our findings show that societal variation in prosocial behavior is linked to beliefs about correct social 391 
norms. They also demonstrate that prosocial behavior becomes increasingly adult-like and normative 392 
during middle childhood, and that during this same period children across societies develop a tendency 393 
to respond (at a personal cost) to social norms about prosocial behavior. In so doing, this project 394 
illustrates how the development of a universal norm psychology can lead to the emergence of societal 395 
variation in prosociality, and it adds to the growing evidence that humans unique forms of cooperation 396 
are highly dependent on acquired cultural norms and institutions.  397 
 398 
Methods 399 
All research and consent procedures were approved by the appropriate university ethical review boards 400 
at: Arizona State University (IRB ID: STUDY00001591), Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee 401 
(PRE.2016.026), Simon Fraser University Office of Research Ethics (Study Number: 2013s0335; Study 402 
Title: Prosocial Development in Vanuatu and Canada). All appropriate national and community bodies 403 
also gave consent for the research, at all of our fieldsites. The authors affirm that human research 404 
participants provided written informed consent, for publication of the images in Figure 1. Images of 405 
participants were taken by experimenters from video recordings of experimental trials. The authors also 406 
affirm that human research participants provided written informed consent for video recordings. 407 
 408 
Participants: See Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1. 409 
 410 
Dictator Game: Children participated in a binary choice Dictator Game (DG), in which the experimental 411 
Subject decided between two pre-determined payoff distributions, referred to below as ratios. Test 412 
ratio #1: 1 for Subject, 1 for Recipient (i.e., 1/1). Test ratio #2: 2 for Subject, 0 for Recipient (i.e., 2/0). 413 
 414 
Apparatus and procedure: Where between-subjects conditions were used, subjects were randomly 415 
assigned to conditions. Data was collected by fieldworkers familiar with the research design and 416 
hypotheses, and so was not blind. The apparatus consisted of two laminated paper trays, each with a 417 
red and a blue circle on them, which were placed in front of the Subject (Supplementary Information, 418 
pg.23). Each tray corresponded to one of the two DG test ratios, with tokens placed in the red circle 419 
going to the Subject, and tokens placed in the blue circle going to the Recipient. The Recipient wasnt 420 
present during the study, but was represented by a small wooden person-shaped figurine. Recipients 421 
and Subjects were anonymous. The experimenter placed tokens on the trays, and the Subject then 422 
selected one of the trays. Recipients were real, and rewards were delivered to them at a later time. For 423 
every choice during the study, different colored meeples was used to indicate that the choices impacted 424 
a different Recipient. See SI Movie S5 for an example of the full study procedure. The procedure was 425 
modified for the Hadza due to the practical need to shorten the study for subjects, details of the full 426 
procedure and the modified Hadza procedure are available in the Supplementary Information (pg.25, 427 
28). All scripts were translated and then back-translated.  428 
 429 
Comprehension checks: At the start of the study, subjects demonstrated that they understood that a 430 
larger quantity of tokens would produce the most rewards, and all participants answered questions to 431 
indicate that when watching the videos they attended to the location of tokens, and remembered the 432 
content of the norm primes (for example, the experimenter pointed to 1/1 and asked is this right or 433 
wrong?, then pointed to 2/0 and asked is this right or wrong?) (Supplementary Information pg.24-434 
25). No participants who passed these comprehension questions were excluded from the sample. 435 
 436 
Rewards: Within the study, rewards were represented as tokens (e.g. glass beads, stones, etc.). Subjects 437 
were informed that the more tokens they received, the more rewards they would receive, but the 438 
precise nature of the rewards or the exchange rate was not communicated to child participants. The 439 
exception to this was for the Hadza, where the use of tokens was not understood by participants, and 440 
small candies were used directly within the study in place of tokens (see the descriptions of the modified 441 
Hadza procedure, below). For children, rewards were sourced locally, and usually consisted of candy or 442 
small food items, or small items like stickers, glow in the dark bracelets, or pens/pencils. Adult 443 
participants were in most cases told what the nature of the rewards would be (e.g., money), and the 444 
general amount usually obtained by participants, but they also understood that the exact amount would 445 
be determined by their choices in the study. At one site (Pune), adults were not told what the reward 446 
would be, they were simply told that they would be obtaining prizes. After the study, tokens were 447 
exchanged for rewards. This either occurred immediately for each participant, or it occurred later after 448 
all subjects had participated, with the rewards being distributed to all participants at the same time. 449 
 450 
Statistical modeling approach: All data were binary choices taking the form of 0 (choice of 2/0) or 1 451 
(choice of 1/1), so we model subjects choices using regression with a binomial link function. For 452 
multilevel models, the posterior distribution of the model can be most easily estimated using Markov 453 
Chain Monte Carlo. When using Markov chain Monte Carlo, we generate model predictions by 454 
processing many samples from the posterior distribution of the model. Each sample of parameter values 455 
from the posterior can be plugged into the model, producing a predicted value for any observable 456 
variable. Since the distribution of the samples approximates the posterior distribution of the 457 
parameters, the distribution of predictions generated from a large number of samples will approximate 458 
the target predictive distribution. Examples of this approach can be found throughout 
46
. 459 
 460 
Data was analyzed in the R Environment for Statistical Computing 
47
, with most models specified using 461 
the function MAP (R package rethinking) 
46
, a convenience tool for fitting a large number of different 462 
regression models. Multilevel models were specified and run using a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo 463 
(an algorithm particularly good with high dimension models) implemented in RStan 
48
. Models were 464 
specified using weakly informative priors, which reduce overfitting and also help the Markov chain to 465 
converge to the posterior distribution more effectively than flat priors. The posterior distribution we 466 
present here is based on 5000 samples from three chains (after 1000 adaptation steps), for a total of 467 
12000 samples. These samples were sufficient to establish convergence to the target posterior 468 
distribution. We assessed convergence through the R-hat Gelman and Rubin statistic (R-hat values 469 
greater than 1.01 can indicate that the chain did not converge), and the effective number of samples for 470 
all parameters were substantial (effective numbers of samples much smaller than the actual number of 471 
samples can suggest that the chain was not efficient). Readers unfamiliar with diagnosing chain 472 
convergence can find an introduction in Chapter 8 of 
46
. 473 
 474 
Data Availability 475 
The authors declare that all data supporting the findings of this study are available within the 476 
Supplementary Information files: Supplementary_Information_R_code_and_data.zip 477 
 478 
Code Availability 479 
The authors declare that all code supporting the findings of this study are available within the 480 
Supplementary Information files: Supplementary_Information_R_code_and_data.zip 481 
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Figure Legends 591 
 592 
Figure 1: Arrangement of the apparatus and testing area. From left: Pune, India; Phoenix, USA; La Plata, 593 
Argentina. 594 
Figure 2: Results of Models 1b, 2, and 3. 2a: Results of Model 1b, estimating the probability that adults 595 
chose 1/1 in the eight societies. Horizontal lines and shaded regions represent regression estimates and 596 
95% CIs (functions MAP and link; R package rethinking). Circles and vertical lines represent 597 
proportions and 95% CIs of the raw data (function binom.confint, R package binom; for exact 598 
proportions see Supplementary Table 2). Triangles represent mean DG offers in a prior study by Henrich 599 
and colleagues 
4
. 2b: Results of Model 2, estimating the probability that adults judged the GENEROUS 600 
norm prime to be most correct. Horizontal lines and shaded regions represent regression estimates 601 
and 95% CIs (functions MAP and link; R package rethinking; for exact proportions see Supplementary 602 
Table 2). Circles and vertical lines represent proportions and 95% CIs of the raw data (function 603 
binom.confint, R package binom). 2c: Results of Model 3, estimating how adults 1/1 choices are 604 
predicted by whether they judged GENEROUS to be most correct, and by the estimated probability 605 
that someone in their society would judge GENEROUS to be most correct. The black line reflects the 606 
weak prior distribution, red the posterior distribution for the Estimated Prob. of Society Judgment 607 
parameter (Supplementary Table 4), blue the posterior distribution for the Subjects Own Judgment 608 
parameter (Supplementary Table 4). 609 
Figure 3: Results of Models 4b, 5, 7 and 8. 3a: Results of Model 4b. Lines represent regression estimates 610 
of the probability that children will choose 1/1 in each of the eight societies, as a function of subject age 611 
(functions MAP and link; R package rethinking). Circles and vertical bars represent proportions and 612 
95% CIs of adults choices of 1/1 (function binom.confint, R package binom). For model coefficients, 613 
see Supplementary Table 5. 3b: Results of Model 5. The solid line plots the magnitude (and 95% CI) of 614 
the estimated relationship between childrens 1/1 choices and the 1/1 choices of adults, as a function of 615 
child age (model constructed in Rstan, link: Bernoulli_logit). This captures the emerging positive 616 
relationship between older childrens DG choices and the DG choices of adults from their society. The 617 
negative values of the effect size for the youngest children is due to young children in Berlin and La Plata 618 
being the least likely to choose 1/1 despite adults from those societies being the most likely to choose 619 
1/1. For model coefficients, see Supplementary Table 6. 3c: Results of Model 7. The solid line plots the 620 
magnitude (and 95% CI) of the estimated relationship between childrens 1/1 choices and the 1/1 621 
choices of adults, as a function of child age (model constructed in Rstan, link: Bernoulli_logit). This 622 
captures the emerging positive relationship between older childrens DG choices and the DG choices of 623 
adults from their society. 3d: Results of Model 8. The solid line plots the magnitude (and 95% CI) of the 624 
estimated relationship between childrens 1/1 choices and adults judgments as to whether or not the 625 
GENEROUS norm prime is most correct, as a function of child age (model constructed in Rstan, link: 626 
Bernoulli_logit). This captures the emerging positive relationship between older childrens DG choices 627 
and judgments about norms by adults from their society. 628 
Figure 4: Results of Models 6c and 6d. 4a: Lines and shaded regions represent regression estimates and 629 
95% CIs for the probability that children will choose 1/1 in the GENEROUS, BOTH OK, and SELFISH norm 630 
prime conditions, combining samples from the six different societies (functions MAP and link; R 631 
package rethinking). 4b-4g. Lines and shaded regions represent regression estimates and 95% CIs for 632 
the probability that children will choose 1/1 in the GENEROUS, BOTH OK, and SELFISH norm prime 633 
conditions, for each of the six different societies (functions MAP and link; R package rethinking).634 
Tables 635 
 636 
Table 1: Populations sampled. For more details see Supplementary Table 1. 637 
Population [Location];  
Description 
N Adult 
(female
) 
N Child 
(female
) 
Child age 
range (in 
years)  
Children received 
which norm priming 
conditions? 
German [Berlin, DEU];  
Urban 
32 (17) 111 (56) 4.07 - 13.36 
BOTH OK, GENEROUS, 
SELFISH 
Argentinian [La Plata, ARG];  
Urban 
29 (13) 133 (65) 4.95 - 13.86 
BOTH OK, GENEROUS, 
SELFISH 
Wichí [Misión Chaqueña, ARG];  
Rural, sedentized hunter-
gatherers 
30 (19) 87 (47) 6.47 - 13.61 
BOTH OK, GENEROUS, 
SELFISH 
American [Phoenix, USA];  
Urban 
37 (19) 176 (92) 4.02 - 12.63 
BOTH OK, GENEROUS, 
SELFISH 
Indian [Pune, IND];  
Urban 
30 (16) 155 (75) 4.11 - 13.92 
BOTH OK, GENEROUS, 
SELFISH 
Shuar [Amazonia, ECU];  
Rural, small-scale horticulture, 
hunting 
20 (8) 58 (27) 6.59 - 15.32 
BOTH OK, GENEROUS, 
SELFISH 
Tanna [Tafea provice, VUT];  
Rural, small-scale horticulture, 
hunting 
52 (27) 81 (43) 5.74 - 13.53 BOTH OK only 
Hadza [Great Rift Valley, TZA];  
Rural, foraging, hunting 
25 (12) 32 (10) 7.00 - 17.00 BOTH OK only 
  638 
Table 2: Model comparisons for Models 1a-1c. Using WAIC and AIC weight. 639 
Model # Model Parameters WAIC (SE) dWAIC (dSE) AIC weight 
1a Intercept only 355.00 (1.37) 26.00 (10.22) 0.00 
1b Society D[8] 329.10 
(10.27) 
0.00 (NA) 0.95 
1c Society D[8], Age, Age X Society D[8],  
Gender, Gender X Society D[8]  
334.80 
(11.07) 
5.70 (3.71) 0.05 
D indicates a dummy parameter, Society D[X] indicates that multiple dummy parameters 
were used for X number of societies. The model with the lowest WAIC provides the best fit, 
dWAIC indicates the difference in WAIC between the focal model and the best-fit model, and dSE 
indicates the standard error for the difference in WAIC. Where AIC weight is substantially larger 
for the best-fit model, this implies that it provides a substantially better fit to the data. Where 
dWAIC is larger than dSE, this also implies that the best-fit model provides a substantially better 
fit to the data. All comparisons were conducted using the compare function in the R package 
rethinking, with n=40000 samples from the posterior for computing WAIC. Bold indicates the 
models that provide the best fit to the data. 
  640 
Table 3: Model comparisons for Models 4a-4d. Using WAIC and AIC weight. 641 
Model # Model Parameters WAIC (SE) dWAIC (dSE) AIC weight 
4a Society D[8] 411.00 
(16.46) 
7.90 (7.97) 0.02 
4b Society D[8], Age, Age X Society D[8] 403.10 
(17.62) 
0.00 (NA) 0.80 
4c Society D[8], Age, Age X Society D[8],  
Age
2
, Age
2
 X Society D[8] 
407.40 
(17.88) 
4.40 (3.55) 0.09 
4d Society D[8], Age, Age X Society D[8],  
Gender, Gender X Society D[8] 
407.20 
(18.02) 
4.20 (4.12) 0.10 
D indicates a dummy parameter, Society D[X] indicates that multiple dummy parameters 
were used for X number of societies. All comparisons were conducted using the compare 
function in the R package rethinking, with n=40000 samples from the posterior for computing 
WAIC. Bold indicates the models that provide the best fit to the data. 
  642 
Table 4: Model comparisons for Models 6a-6d; using WAIC and AIC weight. 643 
Model # Model Parameters WAIC (SE) dWAIC (dSE) AIC 
weight 
6a Society D[6], Age, Age X Society D[6] 883.20 
(21.77) 
136.60 
(22.40) 
0.00 
6b Society D[6], Age, Age X Society D[6],  
GENEROUS D, SELFISH D 
747.00 
(27.90) 
0.30 (4.05) 0.45 
6c Society D[6], Age, Age X Society D[6],  
GENEROUS D, SELFISH D,  
Age X GENEROUS, Age X SELFISH 
746.60 
(28.16) 
0.00 (NA) 0.53 
6d Society D[6], Age, Age X Society D[6],  
GENEROUS D, SELFISH D,  
Age X GENEROUS, Age X SELFISH,  
Age X GENEROUS X Society D[6],  
Age X SELFISH X Society D[6] 
 
754.00 
(28.69) 
7.40 (6.91) 0.01 
D indicates a dummy parameter, Society D[X] indicates that multiple dummy parameters 
were used for X number of societies. All comparisons were conducted using the compare 
function in the R package rethinking, with n=40000 samples from the posterior for computing 
WAIC. Bold indicates the models that provide the best fit to the data. 
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(2c) Model 3 results:
Adults' DG choices predicted by
judgements about correct norms
Regression Coefficient
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Prior: normal (mean=0, sd=2)
Posterior: Subject's Own Judgment
Posterior: Society Judgment
Age (in years)
Pr
ob
.
 
o
f 1
/1
 C
ho
ice
Berlin
La Plata
Phoenix
Pune
Shuar
Wichi
Tanna
Hadza
(3a) Model 4b Results:
Probability of children choosing
the 1/1 option, in all 8 populations
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With increasing age, adult choices
increasingly predict child choices
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